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                          Abstract 
 
The International Maritime Organization (IMO) received its mandate to regulate shipping greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emissions from the Kyoto Protocol. However, the IMO Convention and the UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea also provide it with competence in this area. In exercising its 
mandate, the IMO has developed regulatory initiatives. China’s shipping industry is playing a growing 
role in the international shipping market, and its response to these initiatives will have a substantial 
effect on the future application of these regulations. This article analyses the GHG mandate of the 
IMO, examines the main outcomes achieved within the organization on this issue, and assesses the 
response from China’s shipping industry to this issue. It concludes that the interests of the shipping 
industries from developing countries will need to be taken into account in the development of 
regulatory efforts if a consensus is to be achieved in the global reduction of GHG emissions from 
ships. 
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Climate change is a global issue that requires global responses. As one of the main 
contributions to climate change,1 greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions have attracted mounting 
attention from the international community. One of the crucial global efforts to tackle climate 
change is the establishment of the international climate change regime, which comprises rules, 
norms, principles and procedures applicable to a range of activities.2 International, regional 
and national regulations have been developed since the late 1970s to reduce GHG  
*The author thanks Associate Professor Robin Warner and Professor Warwick Gullett for their valuable 
comments on earlier drafts. However, the author takes full responsibility for the content of the article. 
 
                                                             
1 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 'Fourth Assessment Report' , 2007, available at 
http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/syr/en/contents.html, Synthesis Report, at 36. 
2 Xinyuan Dai, 'Global Regime and National Change' (2010) 10(6) Climate Policy 622-637. See also Patricia W. Birnie, Alan 
E. Boyle and Catherine Redgwell, International Law and the Environment (Oxford University Press, 3rd ed, 2009) at 336.  
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emissions.3 Among them, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC)4 and its Kyoto Protocol5 have served as the backdrop for subsequent efforts to 
promote the international climate change regime.  
One shortcoming of the international climate change regime is that producers of GHG 
emissions from international shipping are exempt from liabilities under the Kyoto Protocol,6 
notwithstanding that the contribution of GHG emissions from international shipping to 
climate change is significant and has been increasing.7 The ‘Second IMO GHG Study 2009’ 
states that in 2007, CO2 emissions from international shipping reached 870 million tonnes, 
which covers 2.7% of the global emissions of CO2
8 Furthermore, if no aggressive regulatory 
policies are introduced, CO2 emissions from international shipping may grow by 150-250% 
by 2050 compared with 2007 due to projected growth in demand for maritime transport 
services.9 Given the urgency of emission reduction and the global nature of the shipping 
industry, a global approach must be employed to regulate GHG emissions from shipping. The 
UNFCCC and the International Maritime Organization (IMO) have responded to this 
imperative and begun to develop a regulatory framework.  
Under the UNFCCC process, the UNFCCC’s Subsidiary Body on Scientific and 
Technological Advice (SBSTA) and the Ad-Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative 
Action (AWG-LCA) have contributed to global regulation on marine bunker fuels, the main 
source of emissions from international shipping. The main difficulty with including GHG 
                                                             
3 See, e.g., Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, 13 November 1979, 18 ILM 1442; Vienna Convention 
for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, 22 March 1985, 26 ILM 1529; Midwest Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord, 15 
November 2007, available at http://www.c2es.org/us-states-regions/regional-climate-initiatives/mggra; Clean Air Act of the 
United States of America, 17 December 1963, 42 USC 7401-7626. 
4 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), 9 May 1992, 31 ILM 848.  
5 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (Kyoto Protocol), 16 March 1998, 37 
ILM 22. 
6 ‘International shipping’ refers to ‘shipping between ports of different countries’, and excludes military and fishing vessels 
engaged on such voyages. Ø. Buhaug, J.J. Corbett, Ø. Endresen, V. Eyring, J. Faber, S. Hanayama, D.S. Lee, D. Lee, H. 
Lindstad, A.Z. Markowska, A. Mjelde, D. Nelissen, J. Nilsen, C. Palsson, J.J. Winebrake, W. Wu, and K. Yoshida, 'Second 
IMO GHG Study 2009' (International Maritime Organization (IMO), London, 2009) Definitions.  
7 The 1997 Kyoto Protocol only listed six types of GHGs, namely CO2, CH4, N2O, HFCs, PFCs and SF6, but a seventh type 
of GHG, NF3 was added to the category in the Durban Climate Change Conference in 2011. The GHG emissions from 
international shipping mainly constitute CO2, C H4, N2O  and HFC. Outcome of the Work of the Ad-Hoc Working Group on 
Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol at its Sixteenth Session, Decision 1/CMP.7, Report of the 
Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol on its Seventh Session, 
FCCC/KP/CMP/2011/10/Add.1 (15 March 2012); Kyoto Protocol Annex A.  
8 Buhaug et al., supra note 6, at 1. These data have been criticised since they do not take account of the global economic 
downturn since 2009. To provide a better foundation for IMO’s future work, an update of the 2009 IMO Study of GHG 
emissions estimate from international shipping is currently being carried out and the final report is expected to be submitted 
to the IMO in 2014. Report of the Expert Workshop on the Update of GHG Emissions Estimate for International Shipping 
(Update-EW), note by the Secretariat, MEPC 65th Session, Agenda Item 5, Doc MEPC 65/5/2 (4 March 2013).  
9 Buhaug et al., supra note 6, at 1.  
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emissions from international shipping in the Kyoto Protocol lies in the allocation of marine 
fuel emissions to different countries.10 In 1996 the SBSTA started to address this problem by 
identifying five options as the basis for future work on the allocation of emissions from 
aviation and marine bunker fuels,11 but States failed to reach consensus on this strategy.12 
Due to the deadlock on the allocation issue, the UNFCCC delegated responsibility to the 
IMO to regulate the issue for shipping under Article 2(2) of its Kyoto Protocol and the IMO 
regularly reports its progress in regulating this matter to the SBSTA. Meanwhile, the AWG-
LCA also discussed the issue of international bunker fuels in the context of paragraph 1b(iv) 
of the Bali Action Plan, 13  cooperative sectoral approaches and sector-specific actions. 
However, under the AWG-LCA the Parties discussed regulatory principles and no substantial 
outcomes had been achieved before the AWG-LCA was terminated at the Doha Climate 
Change Conference in 2012. As a result, regulatory measures to reduce shipping GHG 
emissions currently mainly rely on the work of the IMO.  
As a specialised agency of the UN, the IMO has recognised the problem of GHG 
emissions from ships and has responded to it based on its powers and assumed 
responsibilities under Article 2(2) of the Kyoto Protocol, as well as the Convention on the 
International Maritime Organization (IMO Convention) and the United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea (LOSC).14 In contrast to the efforts made within the UN international 
climate change regime, there are high expectations of the IMO due to its mandate and past 
record in regulating a multitude of shipping-related technical matters. In particular, the newly 
adopted revised Annex VI of the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution 
from Ships (MARPOL 73/78)15 and the guidelines produced by the IMO have assured the 
                                                             
10 Due to the global nature of international shipping, a ship emits GHGs throughout its voyage and this voyage involves 
several countries. It is thus difficult to include ship-based GHG emissions in the State-based Kyoto Protocol system, namely 
to allocate GHG emissions from international shipping to different countries.  
11 These options are: no allocation; allocation to the country where the bunker fuel is sold; allocation to the country of the 
transporting company, the country of registration of registration of the aircraft/vessel, or the country of the operator; 
allocation to the country of departure or destination of the aircraft/vessel; and allocation to the country of departure or 
destination of the passenger/cargo. Sebastian Oberthür, 'Institutional Interaction to Address Greenhouse Gas Emissions from 
International Transport: ICAO, IMO and the Kyoto Protocol' (2003) 3(3) Climate Policy 191-205, at 193.  
12 Ibid. Oberthür asserts that this effort failed because under these options countries that would have been allocated 
substantial amounts of emissions from bunker fuels would be in a disadvantageous situation in international trade, and these 
options are not feasible in domestic implementation.  
13 Bali Action Plan, Decision 1/CP.13, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Thirteenth Session, 
FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1 (14 March 2008).  
14 Convention on the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization, 6 March 1948, 289 UNTS 3, amended and 
renamed as Convention on the International Maritime Organization (IMO Convention), 14 November 1975, 9 UTS 61; 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC), 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 3. A detailed discussion of this 
issue is in the next section. 
15 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL 73/78), 2 November 1973, 12 ILM 1319, 
as amended by the 1978 Protocol to the 1973 Convention, 17 ILM 546. To date, MARPOL 73/78 has adopted six annexes 
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international community of progress regarding the adoption of energy-efficiency measures in 
relation to GHG emissions from shipping.  
Given the amended MARPOL Annex VI and guidelines adopted by the IMO, 
compliance with these measures by different countries, in particular the shipping industries 
from developing countries, will be significant for the reduction of GHG emissions from 
international shipping. This is because developing countries are the main Parties that opposed 
the adoption of the revised MARPOL Annex VI within the IMO, and the vessels flying the 
flags of developing countries (UNFCCC Non-Annex I States) account for over three-quarters 
of the global merchant fleet.16 The adopted IMO instruments, including the technical and 
operational measures, cannot be effectively implemented without compliance by the national 
shipping industries of these countries. Of these developing countries, China’s response, in 
particular the response from its shipping industry, to the efforts made by the IMO will 
provide an important reference for progress in addressing GHG emissions from international 
shipping. This is because China is one of the largest developing countries and shipping 
nations, and its shipping industry shares many characteristics with those of other developing 
countries. Therefore, to some extent the response from China’s shipping industry also 
represents the views from the shipping industries in other developing countries, in particular 
other major developing countries.17  
The first part of this article examines the mandate and competence of the IMO in 
regulating GHG emissions from international shipping. Having established the central role of 
the IMO in providing a solution to the problem, the article then examines and assesses the 
IMO’s efforts in reducing shipping GHG emissions, and the response from China’s shipping 
industry.  
 
IMO’s Mandate and Competence to Regulate GHG Emissions from 
International Shipping 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
and their revisions, namely, Annex I. Oil (entered into force 2 October 1983), Annex II. Noxious Liquid Substances carried 
in Bulk (entered into force 6 April 1987), Annex III. Harmful Substances carried in Packaged Form (entered into force 1 July 
1992), Annex IV. Sewage (entered into force 27 September 2003), Annex V. Garbage (entered into force 31 December 1988), 
and Annex VI. Air Pollution from Ships (entered into force 19 May 2005).  
16 IMO, 'Main Events in IMO's Work on Limitation and Reduction of Greenhouse Gas Emissions from International 
Shipping', 2011, available at http://www.imo.org/MediaCentre/resources/Pages/Greenhouse%20gas%20emissions.aspx, at 
27.  
17 For the purpose of this article, current developing countries can be classified into three categories, namely major 
developing flag States, major Flag of Convenience (FOC) States, and other developing States. A detailed discussion on this 
grouping is provided below.  
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A debate on the origin of the IMO’s mandate in regulating GHG emissions from ships has 
taken place within the IMO. The significance of this debate lies in two aspects. On the one 
hand, the generally accepted origin of the IMO’s mandate could determine which principles 
may apply to the regulation of this issue. Generally if an international agreement gives the 
IMO a mandate, the principles reflected in that agreement should also apply to the regulation 
of the GHG issue by the IMO. On the other hand, this generally accepted origin of the IMO’s 
mandate may determine what type of measures the IMO can adopt to tackle GHG emissions 
issue. This is because the IMO cannot regulate the GHG emissions issue with these types of 
measures which are by their nature beyond its competence. If these types of measures to 
address the GHG emissions issue are to be adopted, collaboration with relevant competent 
international institutions would be necessary. For this issue it can be argued that IMO may 
not be the sole competent international organization. 
Currently two views contribute to this debate. One view attributes the IMO’s mandate in 
regulating GHG emissions from ships solely to the Kyoto Protocol. This view has been 
supported by many developing countries18 and some scholars.19 Article 2(2) of the Kyoto 
Protocol requests the Annex I States of the UNFCCC to ‘work through the IMO’ to limit or 
reduce their GHG emissions from ships. Whether this provision gives the IMO the exclusive 
mandate to regulate this GHG issue is open to debate and dependent on various 
interpretations of the term ‘work through’. However, it ‘establishes a formal link to the IMO’ 
by authorising the IMO to regulate this GHG issue,20 and implies that the IMO should ‘take 
the lead’ on this issue. 21  Furthermore, the acceptance of this mandate by the IMO is 
                                                             
18 See, e.g., China, India, Brazil, Saudi Arabia and some other developing countries all hold that the IMO’s mandate comes 
from the Kyoto Protocol. Report of the Marine Environment Protection Committee on its 59th Session, Statement by the 
Delegation of China on GHG Issues, Doc MEPC 59/24/Add.1 Annex 13 (2009) at para 1; Report of the Marine Environment 
Protection Committee on Its Sixty-First Session, MEPC 61st Session, Agenda Item 24, Doc MEPC 61/24 (6 October 2010) 
Annex 3.  
19 See, e.g., Haifeng Wang, 'GHG Emissions from the International Goods Movement by Ships and the Adaptation Funding 
Distribution' in Zongwei Luo (ed), Green Finance and Sustainability: Environmentally-Aware Business Models and 
Technologies (Business Science Reference, Hershey, 2011) 274-290, at 275; A. Miola, M. Marra and B. Ciuffo, 'Designing A 
Climate Change Policy for the International Maritime Transport Sector: Market-Based Measures and Technological Options 
for Global and Regional Policy Actions' (2011) 39(9) Energy Policy 5490-5498, at 5492; Derya Aydin Okur, The Challenge 
of Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions from International Shipping and the Complicated Principle of 'Common but 
Differentiated Responsibilities', 2012, available at http://web.deu.edu.tr/hukuk/dergiler/dergimiz13-1/2-deryaaydinokur.pdf, 
at 28; Jodie Moffat, 'Arranging Deckchairs on the Titanic: Climate Change, Greenhouse Gas Emissions and International 
Shipping' (2010) 24(2) Australian and New Zealand Maritime Law Journal 104-125, at 105.  
20 Bernd Hackmann, 'Analysis of the Governance Architecture to Regulate GHG Emissions from International Shipping' 
(2012) 12(1) International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics 85-103, at 90.  
21 James Harrison, 'Recent Developments and Continuing Challenges in the Regulation of Greenhouse Gas Emissions from 
International Shipping' (2012) University of Edinburgh Research Paper Series, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2037038, 
at 1.  
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consistent with the IMO Convention.22  Since then the IMO has reported its progress in 
regulating the GHG issue to the SBSTA under the UNFCCC on a regular basis, which could 
be regarded as one of its obligations in fulfilling this mandate. 23  Therefore, it is not 
reasonable to assert that the IMO’s mandate has nothing to do with the Kyoto Protocol.24 
However, Article 2(2) is vague in that it does not recognise the explicit competence of the 
IMO, or define the precise measures that IMO might adopt to address the GHG issue. 
Therefore, in 2011 the International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) called on the participants in 
the Durban Climate Change Conference to give the IMO a clear mandate to reduce emissions 
through market-based measures.25 However, this request was not addressed by the Durban 
conference. Given that a second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol commenced 
on 1 January 2013, a universal climate agreement is to be adopted by 2015 and implemented 
from 2020.26 The new agreement may take the form of a protocol, ‘another legal instrument’ 
or ‘an agreed outcome with legal force’ under the UNFCCC applicable to all Parties.27 
Although there are different views and interpretations on these forms of agreement,28 the 
agreement will still be a part of the UNFCCC regime and be subject to the regulatory 
principles of the UNFCCC. For this reason, it is less likely that the IMO’s mandate and 
competence in regulating the GHG issue, including the regulatory principles and scope, 
would be substantially changed, although it is possible that this mandate could be explicitly 
identified or even slightly modified. Another possibility is that no agreement under the 
UNFCCC will be achieved before 2015. In this case, a number of scenarios, including the 
adoption of an agreement outside the UNFCCC, could occur. Accordingly the current 
                                                             
22 IMO Convention Art 68. This provision stipulates that the IMO may take over functions or obligations within its scope 
from any other international organizations by means of international agreements. 
23 But Hackmann asserts that this cooperation between the UNFCCC and the IMO is ‘reciprocal exchange of information 
and a reciprocal participation in relevant meetings’, and both institutions are independent in their decisions. Hackmann, 
supra note 20, at 95.  
24 See, e.g., Karim and Alam assert that the IMO’s mandate ‘is not subject to the UNFCCC or to its Kyoto Protocol’. Md. 
Saiful Karim and Shawkat Alam, 'Climate Change and Reduction of Emissions of Greenhouse Gases from Ships: An 
Appraisal' (2011) 1(1) Asian Journal of International Law 131-148, at 147-148.  
25 Kevin Cooper, ‘Reducing Shipping Emissions: An Overview of Recent International Initiatives’, 25 September 2012, 
available at http://www.safety4sea.com/analysis/89/134/reducing-shipping-emissions-.  
26 UNFCCC, ‘The Doha Climate Gateway’, 2012, available at 
http://unfccc.int/key_steps/doha_climate_gateway/items/7389.php.  
27 Establishment of An Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action, UNFCCC Decision 1/CP.17, 
Doc FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1 (2011) at para 2.  
28 See, e.g., ‘another legal instrument’ could be an amendment under Article 15, a new or an amended annex under Article 16, 
an amendment to the Kyoto Protocol, or an implementation agreement similar to a protocol; ‘an agreed outcome with legal 
force’ could be unilateral declarations by Parties, or COP decisions. Xolisa Ngwadla, Achala C. Abeysinghe and Adéyêmi 
Freitas, ‘The 2015 Climate Agreement: Lessons from the Bali Road Map’, 2012, available at 
http://www.eurocapacity.org/downloads/2015ClimateAgreement.pdf, at 7-8.  
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discussion on the IMO’s mandate to regulate the GHG issue may also be significantly 
influenced by these developments.  
The other view about the origin of the IMO’s mandate is that the IMO gets its global 
mandate from the IMO Convention, the LOSC and IMO Resolution 8, but not from Article 
2(2) of the Kyoto Protocol. This view is held by the Sub-Division for Legal Affairs of the 
IMO, 29  and some scholars. 30  According to this view, Articles 1(a) and 64 of the IMO 
Convention provide the IMO with a global mandate and global competence ‘in the field of 
shipping and the effect of shipping on the marine environment’,31 in particular in relation to 
‘technical matters of all kinds affecting shipping engaged in international trade’.32 Articles 
211(1) and 212(3) of the LOSC request States Parties to ‘establish global rules, standards, 
and recommended practices and procedures’ to prevent, reduce and control atmospheric and 
vessel-source marine pollution. In particular, these actions shall be conducted through 
diplomatic conferences or a competent international organization (the IMO). Therefore, the 
LOSC defines flag, coastal and port State jurisdiction, while the IMO specifies how member 
State jurisdiction should be exercised to meet IMO safety and shipping anti-pollution 
regulations.33 Furthermore, Resolution 8 on ‘CO2 emissions from ships’ was adopted by the 
MARPOL Conference of the Parties in 1997. This resolution requested the IMO to start its 
work on the reduction of GHG emissions from ships and has therefore been regarded as a key 
legal document underpinning subsequent regulatory efforts by the IMO. In addition, those 
who take the view that attributes the IMO’s mandate to these three sources exclude Article 
2(2) of the Kyoto Protocol as a source of the IMO’s mandate relating to the GHG issue. It is 
asserted that there has been no precedent for any IMO treaty instruments adopting a common 
but differentiated approach similar to that incorporated in the Kyoto Protocol. 34  This 
argument, however, runs counter to the legal basis for the first view on the IMO’s mandate to 
regulate the GHG emissions issue. Generally an organization which receives and accepts a 
mandate under an international agreement cannot question principles incorporated in that 
agreement simply based on its own previous practice which is incompatible with such 
principles. 
                                                             
29 IMO, supra note 16, at 28.  
30 See, e.g., Karim and Alam, supra note 24, at 147-148; Oberthür, supra note 11, at 195.  
31 IMO Convention Art 64.  
32 IMO Convention Art 1(a).  
33 Implications of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea for the International Maritime Organization, Doc 
LEG/MISC.6 (10 September 2008) at 13.  
34 IMO, supra note 16, at 28.  
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From an international law perspective, the above two views both have their legal bases. 
There is no clear hierarchy between the Kyoto Protocol and IMO Convention and the LOSC 
on the issue and it is open to debate which rules should prevail if there is a conflict between 
these treaties.35 For this reason, it might be appropriate to strike a compromise between the 
two views. It is clear that the IMO Convention and the LOSC provide the IMO with general 
competence to regulate GHG emissions from ships, while the Kyoto Protocol gives the IMO 
a specific mandate to regulate this matter. The two interpretations of the IMO’s mandate are 
thus consistent and the IMO can utilise both these competences to regulate GHG emissions 
from international shipping.  
An important implication of the above compromise interpretation is that principles 
incorporated in the Kyoto Protocol and the IMO Convention will also apply to the regulation 
of the GHG issue, namely, the ‘Common but Differentiated Responsibility’ (CBDR) principle 
which runs through the UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol,36 and the ‘No More Favourable 
Treatment’ (NMFT) principle incorporated in all IMO treaties. 37  The CBDR principle 
requires both developed and developing States to contribute to addressing environmental 
problems, and imposes the primary responsibility on developed States due to their different 
historical contribution to the problems and the differentiated capability of developed and 
developing States. This principle was first explicitly formulated in Principle 7 of the 1992 
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development,38  and has been widely accepted and 
endorsed in many conventions and treaties, such as the 1992 Convention on Biological 
Diversity,39 the 1992 UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol. The NMFT principle refers to ‘port 
States enforcing applicable standards in a uniform manner to all ships in their ports, 
regardless of flag’.40 Under the IMO Convention, Article 1(b) describes the ‘removal of 
discriminatory action’ as one of the purposes of the IMO, and Article 3 treats the ‘normal 
processes of international shipping business’ as a recommended way to deal with shipping-
related matters. Indeed these two Articles provide a legal basis for the NMFT principle. The 
                                                             
35
 Since the Kyoto Protocol, IMO Convention and the LOSC vary extensively in their context and scope, Article 30 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties cannot apply to addressing conflicts between these treaties. Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, 8 ILM 679. A general discussion on this GHG issue has been conducted elsewhere by the 
author. Yubing Shi, ‘The Challenge of Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions from International Shipping: Assessing the 
International Maritime Organization’s Regulatory Response’ (2012) Yearbook of International Environmental Law (in press).  
36 See, e.g., UNFCCC Preamble para 6, Arts 3(1), 4; Kyoto Protocol Art. 10.  
37 See, e.g., MARPOL 73/78 Art 5(4).  
38 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, 14 June 1992, 31 ILM 874.  
39 Convention on Biological Diversity, 5 June 1992, 31 ILM 818, Art 20(4).  
40 Buhaug et al., supra note 6, at 20.  
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term NMFT was included in MARPOL 73/78 and applies to all annexes to the Convention. 
To date this principle has been consistently applied without exception to all 53 IMO treaty 
instruments currently in existence.41 To attract more participation in the reduction of the GHG 
emissions from shipping by developing countries, incorporating the CBDR principle into the 
current GHG reduction regime in this way represents a practical compromise.  
How to incorporate both the CBDR and NMFT principles into the IMO’s regulation of 
shipping GHG emissions is a difficult issue. To address this issue, two assumptions can be 
made. One is that the CBDR principle is State-based whereas the NMFT principle is ship-
based, so there is no irreconcilable conflict between them. The other is that common 
responsibility and differentiated responsibility are two core elements of the CBDR principle 
and common responsibility has been incorporated into this issue via the NMFT principle,42 so 
the key to applying the CBDR principle is effective incorporation of differentiated 
responsibility. There are different interpretations of the implications of the CBDR principle, 
in particular the meaning of ‘differentiated responsibility’. Due to the complexity of the issue 
of GHG emissions from shipping, the adoption of a broad interpretation of differentiated 
treatment would be practical. Based on current international environmental agreements, 
‘differentiated responsibility’ consists of three categories, namely differentiated central 
obligations, differentiated implementation arrangements, and the granting of assistance, 
including financial and technological assistance.43 Accordingly, the CBDR principle could be 
applied to the GHG issue in different ways depending on the nature of various measures for 
addressing this issue. Measures dealing with shipping GHG emissions within the IMO can be 
classified into three categories: technical measures, operational measures, and market-based 
measures (MBMs). In terms of technical and operational measures adopted by the IMO in 
2011, strengthening effective transfer of technologies and financial assistance from developed 
countries to developing countries would constitute an application of the CBDR principle to 
this issue as indicated in the third category of differentiated responsibility.44 As a requirement 
of the NMFT principle, port States exercise uniform control on all ships calling at their ports 
through participation in various Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) on Port State 
                                                             
41 IMO, ‘Status of Conventions: List of IMO Conventions and Their Amendments’, 16 May 2013, available at 
http://www.imo.org/About/Conventions/StatusOfConventions/Pages/Default.aspx.  
42 MARPOL 73/78 Art 5(4).  
43 Lavanya Rajamani, Differential Treatment in International Environmental Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006) at 
191.  
44 Regulation 23 of the amended MARPOL Annex VI in 2011 stipulates the transfer of technology and financial assistance; 
however, this regulation is still very weak and thus needs to be strengthened. A detailed discussion on this issue is provided 
in the following section.  
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Control.45 For this reason, it would be difficult to implement differentiated central obligations 
as indicated in the first category of differentiated responsibility with regard to the issue of 
GHG emissions from shipping.46 Indeed this category of differentiated responsibility is often 
claimed by developing countries as the main form of the CBDR principle.47 Meanwhile, the 
difficulty in applying the first category of differentiated responsibility to technical and 
operational GHG-reduction measures is also underpinned by the existence of Flag-of-
Convenience (FOC) States.48 Assume that developing flag States are exempt from complying 
with IMO GHG-reduction regulations, as implied by the first category of the CBDR principle; 
in these circumstances, shipowners from developed countries would probably opt for flagging 
their ships under these FOC States to avoid the stringent regulations and increased cost in 
their own States flowing from compliance with these regulations. As of 1 January 2012, ships 
registered in developing countries (including the ten major FOC countries) accounted for 
83.03% of the world fleet by deadweight tonnage (dwt), which if combined with the FOC 
would render these GHG-reduction measures barely effective.49 Theoretically a phased-in 
application of the CBDR principle to this GHG issue as indicated in the second category of 
differentiated responsibility would be feasible.50 Indeed during the discussions within the 
IMO, some developing countries proposed this approach to postpone the application of 
                                                             
45 Port State Control refers to ‘the inspection of foreign ships in national ports to verify that the condition of the ship and its 
equipment comply with the requirements of international regulations and that the ship is manned and operated in compliance 
with these rules’. With the support of the IMO, to date various regional port State control organizations and agreements on 
Port State Control, namely the MOUs, have been signed to cover all of the world’s oceans. IMO, Port State Control, 
available at http://www.imo.org/blast/mainframe.asp?topic_id=159.  
46 Some States proposed that combining both principles could be achieved by differentiating commitments for developed and 
developing countries based on certain routes of shipping without relying on the nationality of ships. However, due to various 
regional MOUs on port State control, in practice this proposal is not feasible. Miola et al., supra note 19, at 5492.  
47 For instance, when China and India mentioned the application of the CBDR principle to this issue, they generally 
explained that only developed countries should commit themselves to compulsory GHG emission reductions from 
international shipping, while energy-efficiency measures should be voluntary for developing countries. Report of the Marine 
Environment Protection Committee on Its Sixty-First Session, MEPC 61st Session, Agenda Item 24, Doc MEPC 61/24 (6 
October 2010) Annex 3, at 1-3.  
48 To date there is no uniform definition of the FOC. For example, Egiyan defines the FOC as ‘national flags of those States 
in which shipowners register their ships so as to avoid: (a) financial obligations; and (b) the nature and conditions of 
shipping were their vessels registered in their own countries’; Griffin defines the FOC as ‘flags of certain countries whose 
laws make it easy and attractive for ships owned by foreign nationals or companies to fly these flags’. G. S. Egiyan, '‘Flag of 
Convenience’ or ‘Open Registration’ of Ships' (1990) 14(2) Marine Policy 106-111, at 107; Andrew Griffin, 'MARPOL 
73/78 and Vessel Pollution: A Glass Half Full or Half Empty?' (1994) 1(2) Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 489-513, 
at 506.  
49 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 'Review of Maritime Transport', 2012, available at 
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/rmt2012_en.pdf, at 46.  
50 See Miola et al., supra note 19, at 5492. For example, it was proposed that a three-phased approach could be employed to 
address this GHG issue, namely the set-up of a scheme for voluntary participation by the countries and ports as the first step, 
a scheme that covers all traffic in the ports of UNFCCC Annex I countries as the second step, and finally this scheme would 
be extended to cover all countries on a global level.  
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relevant regulations to developing countries.51 However, due to the concern for the FOC and 
the urgency of addressing this issue against the backdrop of global climate change, this 
option was not adopted by the IMO. 
With respect to MBMs more options are available to incorporate the two principles. One 
possibility is to apply the CBDR principle to the issue by allocating differentiated central 
obligations to developed countries and developing countries so as to ensure ‘no net incidence 
on developing countries’,52 as indicated in the first category of differentiated responsibility. 
Currently some proposed MBMs incorporating both principles have been submitted to the 
IMO for further discussion. 53  This approach has also been supported by the UNFCCC 
Secretariat,54  as well as by other countries and international organizations.55  Since these 
MBM proposals also apply the NMFT principle, the effectiveness of these measures is 
unlikely be influenced by FOC States. 
Another potential implication of any compromise reached on the application of both the 
NMFT and CBDR principles to the issue of GHG emissions from shipping could be that the 
IMO is the sole competent international organization for regulating technical and operational 
measures for ships in this context, but that its role in regulating the relevant MBMs depends 
upon the nature of specific measures and could be shared with other competent international 
organizations in this field. To date across the three types of GHG-reduction measures, the 
technical and operational measures have been adopted by the IMO alone. However, the 
MBMs currently being discussed within the IMO could be considered as being beyond the 
competence that the IMO has received from the IMO Convention and the LOSC. This is 
                                                             
51
 Comments on the Proposed Mandatory Energy Efficiency Regulations, submitted by China, Saudi Arabia and South Africa, 
MEPC 62nd Session, Agenda Item 5, Doc MEPC 62/5/10 (5 May 2011) at para 14. In this document, the co-sponsors 
proposed a draft text which provided that, ‘the regulations of EEDI and SEEMP shall apply to ships of developing countries 
five years after the date of their entry into force’; or ‘shall be phased in over a period of eight years for ships built for 
developing countries and during the period of phasing in, developing countries shall only apply 50% of the required EEDI 
reduction rate’. 
52 Ensuring No Net Incidence on Developing Countries from A Global Maritime Market-Based Mechanism, submitted by 
World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), MEPC 63rd Session, Agenda Item 5, Doc MEPC 63/5/6 (22 December 2011).  
53 See, e.g., the Rebate Mechanism proposed by the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) has incorporated 
the CBDR and NMFT principles.  
54 Report of the Marine Environment Protection Committee on Its Sixty-First Session, MEPC 61st Session, Agenda Item 24, 
MEPC 61/24 (6 October 2010) Annex 6, at 2. At the 61st MEPC meeting, the UNFCCC Secretariat made a statement, which 
asserts that ‘[w]e have to commit ourselves to work on a solution which respects both principles, and allows each treaty 
regime to retain the integrity of its principles and practices’. 
55 See, e.g., Malaysia, Ethiopia and WWF support the adoption of both principles in addressing the GHG issue. Report of the 
Marine Environment Protection Committee on Its Sixtieth Session, MEPC 60th Session, Agenda Item 22, Doc MEPC 60/22 
(12 April 2010) Annex 4, at 10; Report of the Marine Environment Protection Committee on Its Sixty-First Session, MEPC 
61st Session, Agenda Item 24, Doc MEPC 61/24 (6 October 2010) Annex 3, at 11; Ensuring No Net Incidence on Developing 
Countries from A Global Maritime Market-Based Mechanism, submitted by WWF, MEPC 63rd Session, Agenda Item 5, Doc 
MEPC 63/5/6 (22 December 2011).  
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because some of these measures involve global emissions reduction from different sectors,56 
and also go beyond the scope of technical matters relating to shipping. Indeed paragraphs (b) 
and (c) of Article 1 of the IMO Convention give the IMO the competence to regulate 
commercial aspects of shipping aiming to remove discriminatory and ‘unfair restrictive 
practices’. However, due to the potential threat to the practice of free enterprise through the 
IMO’s regulating the commercial aspects of shipping, many States have united to limit the 
purposes of the IMO to technical aspects.57 To date the IMO has never been allowed to 
exercise its full economic mandate.58 Theoretically speaking, the mandate that the IMO has 
from the Kyoto Protocol also gives it the competence for such work. However, as mentioned 
earlier, the vagueness of this mandate leaves room for further interpretation. Therefore, it is 
possible that in the future in order to regulate MBMs involving out-of-sector emissions 
reduction and international trade, the IMO would collaborate with other international 
organizations, such as the UNFCCC or the World Trade Organization, due to their broader 
competence or expertise in international trade.  
 
The IMO’s Regulatory Efforts in Reducing GHG Emissions from Ships 
 
IMO started its work on the reduction of GHG emissions from ships in 1997 when it adopted 
Resolution 8 on ‘CO2 emissions from ships’.
59  Since then, numerous discussions and 
negotiations on this issue have been held within the organization, in particular within the 
Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC) of the IMO. However, it was not until 
July 2011 that the first legally binding agreement on regulating the GHG issue was adopted. 
This agreement takes the form of an amendment to MARPOL Annex VI. It regulates the 
GHG issue from technical and operational perspectives. This section provides a general 
introduction to and assessment of the technical and operational measures adopted by the IMO, 
                                                             
56 The third Intersessional Meeting of the Working Group on GHG Emissions from Ships grouped the MBMs proposals into 
two categories, namely ‘focus on in-sector’ and ‘in-sector and out-of-sector’. Based on this grouping, current MBM 
proposals involving out-of-sector emission reductions are the International GHG Fund, the Emissions Trading Scheme, the 
Port State Levy and the Rebate Mechanism. Report of the Third Intersessional Meeting of the Working Group on Greenhouse 
Gas Emissions from Ships, note by the Secretariat, MEPC 62nd Session, Agenda Item 5, Doc MEPC 62/5/1 (8 April 2011) 
Annex 3.  
57 G. P. Pamborides, International Shipping Law: Legislation and Enforcement (Kluwer Law International, Leiden, 1999) at 
83.  
58 Although the Facilitation Committee of the IMO has regulated some matters involving elements of trade, the purposes of 
these regulations are generally to be achieved by technical means. See also Alan Khee-Jin Tan, Vessel-source Marine 
Pollution: the Law and Politics of International Regulation (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006) at 75.  
59 IMO, supra note 16, at 3. Resolution 8 requests the IMO to undertake a study on GHG emissions from ships and to 
consider feasible emissions reduction strategies.  
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as well as the proposed MBMs currently being discussed within the organization.  
 
Technical and Operational Measures 
 
On 15 July 2011, the 62nd MEPC meeting adopted the revised MARPOL Annex VI. Through 
adding a new Chapter 4 to Annex VI on Regulation on Energy Efficiency for Ships, the 
amendment makes mandatory the Energy Efficiency Design Index (EEDI) for new ships, and 
the Ship Energy Efficiency Management Plan (SEEMP) for all ships. As the main technical 
measure, the EEDI provides a specific figure representing a minimum energy-efficiency level 
for certain ship types and size segments, expressed in grams of CO2 per ship’s capacity-
nautical mile (e.g., g/tonne nautical mile). The lower EEDI indicates a better energy 
efficiency of ship design. Regulations 20 and 21 divide it into Attained EEDI and Required 
EEDI, 60  and both of them are calculated by formulae based on the technical design 
parameters for a given ship.61 Based on the formula, the Attained EEDI should be less than or 
equal to the Required EEDI. 62  The EEDI is a ‘non-prescriptive and performance-based’ 
mechanism,63 according to which the ship designers and shipbuilders are free to choose the 
most cost-efficient technological solutions for the ship once the minimum energy-efficiency 
level required by the EEDI is achieved. A strong incentive is thus provided for the shipping 
industry to improve ship fuel consumption with updated technical developments. However, 
this mechanism is not a commercial incentive scheme. The EEDI is basically a ‘hard rule’, 
based on which substandard ships are not allowed to trade, although the way to meet this 
standard is left to the shipping industry. Furthermore, as a political compromise between 
developing and developed countries, 64  Regulations 19.4 and 19.5 provide that for some 
countries the actual commencement date of the EEDI may be postponed to six-and-a-half 
years from 1 January 2013.65 This waiver clause applies to all flag States which prefer to give 
                                                             
60 Attained EEDI refers to the EEDI value achieved by an individual ship in accordance with Regulation 20 of Chapter 4, 
MARPOL Annex VI; Required EEDI is the maximum value of attained EEDI that is allowed by Regulation 21 of Chapter 4 
for the specific ship type and size. MARPOL Annex VI (2011) Regs 2.36-37.  
61 The formula of Required EEDI is indicated by Regulation 21 of MARPOL Annex VI; the formula of Attained EEDI is 
provided by its guidelines. 2012 Guidelines on the Method of Calculation of the Attained Energy Efficiency Design Index 
(EEDI) for New Ships, Resolution MEPC.212(63), Doc MEPC 63/23 Annex 8 (2 March 2012) Art 2.  
62 MARPOL Annex VI (2011) Reg 21.1.3.  
63 IMO, supra note 16, at 12.  
64 See, e.g., Report of the Marine Environment Protection Committee on Its Sixty-First Session, MEPC 61st Session, Agenda 
Item 24, Doc MEPC 61/24 (6 October 2010) Secs 5.32-5.33. 
65 This calculation is based on the delivery date of new ships. New ships in certain flag States will also be exempt from 
complying with the EEDI until 1 January 2017 based on their contract date. MARPOL Annex VI (2011) Reg 19.5.2.  
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a long lead time for phasing in the EEDI to ships registered under their flags. Due to technical 
difficulties, in July 2011 the EEDI only applied to seven ship types and excluded the 
application of ships with diesel-electric propulsion, turbine propulsion and hybrid 
propulsion,66 but in May 2013 the application of the EEDI was approved by the 65th MEPC 
meeting to cover more ship types.67 
The SEEMP is an operational measure regulated through amendments to MARPOL 
Annex VI in 2011. It constitutes the other component of the energy-efficiency measures in 
addition to the EEDI. As a ship-specific energy management plan, the SEEMP provides a 
flexible mechanism for shipowners and ship operators to monitor ship and fleet efficiency 
performance over time in a cost-effective manner. The main objective of the SEEMP is to 
minimise shipping GHG emissions by means of reducing fuel consumption,68  while the 
Energy Efficiency Operational Indicator (EEOI) is often utilised as a monitoring tool and to 
establish benchmarks related to ships’ energy efficiency. 69  In contrast to the EEDI, the 
SEEMP applies to all existing and new ships of 400 gross tonnage and above. As a ‘ship-
specific’ plan, the content of the SEEMP for a specific ship does not need approval by the 
flag State.70 
The newly adopted technical and operational measures by the IMO are a significant 
advance in regulating GHG emissions from ships. The adoption of these measures was a 
breakthrough in the lengthy deadlock of the negotiations between various countries on 
shipping GHG emissions within the IMO, and also confirmed the leading role of the IMO in 
regulating this issue.71 Since the EEDI and SEEMP regulations only entered into force on 1 
January 2013, in practice compliance with these regulations by various States and their 
emissions-reduction potential cannot yet be evaluated. However, an IMO Assessment Report 
has concluded through scenario modelling that the estimated CO2 emissions reduction due to 
combined EEDI and SEEMP will lead to significant emission reductions, if projected growth 
                                                             
66 MARPOL Annex VI (2011) Regs 21, Tables 1,2; 19.3.  
67 IMO, ‘IMO Marine Environment Protection Committee 65th Session Pushes Forward with Energy-Efficiency 
Implementation’, 21 May 2013, available at http://www.imo.org/MediaCentre/PressBriefings/Pages/18-MEPC65ENDS.aspx.  
68 Zabi Bazari and Tore Longva, 'Assessment of IMO Mandated Energy Efficiency Measures for International Shipping', 31 
October 2011, Doc MEPC 63/INF.2, Annex, Appendix 4, at 12.  
69 The EEOI can be applied to almost all new and existing ships, and is generally used to measure ships energy efficiency for 
each voyage or over a certain period of time. It enables ship operators to measure the fuel efficiency of a ship in operation 
and to gauge the effect of any changes in operation. Currently the EEOI is circulated to encourage shipowners and ship 
operators to use it on a voluntary basis.  
70 Report of the Outcomes of the Intersessional Meeting of the Working Group on Energy Efficiency Measures for Ships, 
MEPC 61st Session, Agenda Item 5, Doc MEPC 61/5/3 (7 July 2010) at para 2.24.  
71 IMO, supra note 16, at para 99.  
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in world trade is not taken into consideration.72 Both the EEDI and the SEEMP highlight the 
importance of safe navigation of ships while also improving the energy efficiency of 
shipping.73 Through this regulation, the EEDI and SEEMP requirements are linked to other 
IMO treaties on maritime safety and security, such as the 1972 Convention on the 
International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREG). 74  This regulation 
provides a technological threshold for shipowners and ship operators. Additionally, the 
‘freedom from prescription’ approach employed by both the EEDI and SEEMP has been 
supported by the global shipping industry, which to a significant extent will promote the 
implementation of these measures by the industry.75  
Notwithstanding the benefits of these technical and operational measures in reducing 
GHG emissions, some deficiencies remain and create challenges for future implementation of 
these measures. First of all, the effectiveness of these measures needs to be improved and 
strengthened. Regarding the EEDI, it only applies to certain types of new ships (covering 70% 
of emissions from new ships), and existing ships are not covered by the EEDI. This situation, 
if combined with the lenient timetable as introduced in the regulation and the projected 
growth in international trade,76 would significantly reduce the effectiveness of the EEDI. The 
65th MEPC meeting in May 2013 approved draft amendments to MARPOL Annex VI, with a 
view to adoption at the 66th MEPC meeting in March 2014, to extend the application of the 
EEDI to cover more ship types.77 However, not all ship types and sizes have been included in 
the EEDI coverage. Meanwhile, the 65th MEPC meeting agreed to exempt cargo ships with 
ice-breaking capability from the EEDI requirements, which may further reduce the 
effectiveness of the EEDI. As to the SEEMP, the lack of reduction target-setting and 
monitoring weakens the effect of this measure.78 This deficiency needs to be rectified by 
means of the provision of other incentives.79 As a management plan, the SEEMP actually 
                                                             
72 Bazari and Longva, supra note 68, executive summary, at 8.  
73 See, e.g., MARPOL Annex VI (2011) Reg 21.5; 2012 Guidelines for the Development of A Ship Energy Efficiency 
Management Plan (SEEMP), Resolution MEPC.213(63), Doc MEPC 63/23 Annex 9 (2 March 2012) Reg 3.7.  
74 Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 20 October 1972, UKTS 77.  
75 See, e.g., at the 57th MEPC meeting, the International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) proposed five principles for guiding the 
amendment of MARPOL Annex VI, and one of them is that the ship operators should have the freedom to choose their 
compliance mechanism so as to protect the shipping industry from monopolistic situations. It treated the ‘freedom from 
prescription’ as the most effective means for stimulating future innovation. The Revision of MARPOL Annex VI, submitted 
by the International Chamber of Shipping (ICS), MEPC 57th Session, Agenda Item 4, Doc MEPC 57/4/28 (13 February 2008) 
at para 5.3.  
76 MARPOL Annex VI (2011) Reg 21.1-2, Table 1.  
77 IMO, supra note 65.  
78 Bazari and Longva, supra note 68, executive summary, at 7. 
79 Ibid., Annex, at 15. The report lists some of the drivers for more effective use of the SEEMP, including high fuel and 
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entails no reduction requirement at all. To improve the effectiveness of the SEEMP, an IMO 
Assessment Report recommends that EEOI should be encouraged or mandated as a 
performance indicator for the SEEMP rather than maintaining its current voluntary status.80 
The lack of sufficient support from major developing countries also imposes challenges 
for the future implementation of the EEDI and SEEMP measures. Unlike many IMO treaties 
adopted by consensus, the amended MARPOL Annex VI was adopted by a majority of the 
member States present and voting based on Rule 27 of the Rules of Procedures of the 
MEPC.81 Some developing countries, such as Brazil, China, India, Saudi Arabia and the 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, made statements opposing these amendments after they 
were adopted.82 To assist in the implementation of the EEDI and SEEMP measures, the 63rd 
MEPC meeting in March 2012 adopted four important guidelines. 83  According to the 
amendments and their guidelines, a four-phase implementation and two-stage survey and 
verification process of the EEDI has been put in place. 84  These arrangements give the 
shipping industry time to conduct necessary preparations, such as technology research and 
development and staff training, to ensure the smooth implementation of the EEDI. 
Furthermore, the amendments now provide for a four-step approach through the SEEMP to 
improve a ship’s energy efficiency, namely planning, implementation, monitoring, and self-
evaluation and improvement.85 However, the main reason behind the opposition to these 
amendments from large developing countries is the lack of incorporation of the CBDR 
principle in the EEDI and SEEMP.86 As discussed in the previous section, strengthening 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
carbon prices, more vigorous awareness building and cultural change on board ships, more collaboration between industry 
stakeholders and a solution to the issue of split incentives, and effective monitoring of SEEMP implementation via rigorous 
audits and reviews.  
80 Ibid, Annex, at 7.  
81 IMO, Basic Documents Volume I (International Maritime Organization, London, 2010) at 113. The amendment was 
adopted by a vote of 49 parties in favour, 5 against, with 2 abstentions and 3 absences. The 5 countries voting against were 
Brazil, Chile, China, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. India was not a Party to MARPOL at the time of voting in July 2011, but has 
become a formal Party to MARPOL and Annex VI since 23 February 2012.  
82 Report of the Marine Environment Protection Committee on Its Sixty-Second Session, MEPC 62nd Session, Agenda Item 
24, Doc MEPC 62/24 (26 July 2011) Annex 20.  
83 These four guidelines are: 2012 Guidelines on the Method of Calculation of the Attained Energy Efficiency Design Index 
for New Ships (EEDI Calculation Guidelines), Resolution MEPC.212(63), Doc MEPC 63/23 Annex 8 (2 March 2012); 2012 
Guidelines for the Development of A Ship Energy Efficiency Management Plan (SEEMP Guidelines), Resolution 
MEPC.213(63), Doc MEPC 63/23 Annex 9 (2 March 2012); 2012 Guidelines on Survey and Certification of the Energy 
Efficiency Design Index (EEDI Survey and Certification Guidelines), Resolution MEPC.214(63), Doc MEPC 63/23/Add.1 
Annex 10 (2 March 2012); Guidelines for Calculation of Reference Lines for Use with the Energy Efficiency Design Index 
(EEDI Reference Lines Guidelines), Resolution MEPC.215(63), Doc MEPC 63/23/Add.1 Annex 11 (2 March 2012).  
84 MARPOL Annex VI (2011) Regs 21, 5-9; EEDI Survey and Certification Guidelines Reg 4.1.1.  
85 SEEMP Guidelines Reg 4. 
86 Report of the Marine Environment Protection Committee on Its Sixty-Second Session, MEPC 62nd Session, Agenda Item 
24, Doc MEPC 62/24 (26 July 2011) Annex 20.  
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effective transfer of technologies and financial assistance from developed countries to 
developing countries could constitute an application of the CBDR principle to the GHG issue. 
Regulation 23 of MARPOL Annex VI requires developed countries to promote the 
development and transfer of technology to developing countries in cooperation with other 
countries. However, this provision does not impose ‘concrete obligations’ on any State,87 and 
stipulates that this technical cooperation is subject to national laws, regulations and policies.88 
It is likely that the transfer of technology from developed countries to developing countries 
will not be straightforward due to various domestic regulations on intellectual property 
protection in developed countries. 89  In developed countries, most energy-efficient 
technologies are owned by private shipping companies, so how to achieve the successful 
transfer of technologies in a cost-effective manner remains a difficult question.90  
To address the criticism from developing countries and triggered by a proposal 
submitted by South Africa, 91  the 65th MEPC meeting in May 2013 adopted a MEPC 
Resolution on Promotion of Technical Co-operation and Transfer of Technology relating to 
the Improvement of Energy Efficiency of Ships. This Resolution explicitly recognises both 
the NMFT principle and the CBDR principle,92 and requests the Organization to provide 
technical assistance and funding for developing countries.93 According to this Resolution, an 
expert working group will be established to facilitate the transfer of technology for ships.94 
However, this Resolution still does not impose concrete obligations to transfer such 
technology for any State, but rather underscores respect for intellectual property rights.95 The 
protection of intellectual property rights has often been regarded as a formidable obstacle to 
                                                             
87 Harrison, supra note 21, at 16.  
88 MARPOL Annex VI (2011) Reg 23.2.  
89 Harrison, supra note 21, at 17.  
90 This question does not occur in the International Convention for the Control and Management of Ships’ Ballast Water and 
Sediments (BWM Convention) adopted by the IMO in 2004, where there are similar technological standards. This is because 
the IMO was not mandated by the Kyoto Protocol to adopt the BWM Convention and accordingly only the NMFT principle 
applies to this matter instead of the CBDR principle. Therefore, Article 13 of the BWM Convention only stipulates technical 
assistance and co-operation generally rather than facilitating the transfer of technology from developed countries to 
developing countries with the recognition of the CBDR principle. International Convention for the Control and Management 
of Ships’ Ballast Water and Sediments, 13 February 2004, IMO Doc BWM/CONF/36.  
91 See, e.g., Report of the Marine Environment Protection Committee on Its Sixty-First Session, MEPC 61st Session, Agenda 
Item 24, Doc MEPC 61/24 (6 October 2010) Annex 5, at 1; Amendment to Draft Compromise MEPC Resolution on 
Promotion of Technical Co-operation and Transfer of Technology relating to the Improvement of Energy Efficiency of Ships, 
submitted by South Africa, MEPC 65th Session, Agenda Item 4, Doc MEPC 65/4/33/Corr.1 (16 May 2013).  
92 Promotion of Technical Co-operation and Transfer of Technology relating to the Improvement of Energy Efficiency of 
Ships (Resolution MEPC.229(65)), Doc Resolution MEPC.229(65) (17 May 2013) Preamble paras 3-4.  
93 Resolution MEPC.229(65) Art 1.  
94 Resolution MEPC.229(65) Art 3.  
95 Resolution MEPC.229(65) Art 4.  
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the transfer of technologies,96 which, if combined with the non-binding nature of a Resolution, 
would make the implementation of this Resolution by developed countries difficult. 
Therefore it appears that a market-based approach to technology acquisition might be a better 
option for developing countries. Indeed Article 66(2) of the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 97  requires developed country parties to 
‘provide incentives to enterprises and institutions in their territories for the purpose of 
promoting and encouraging technology transfer to least developed country members in order 
to enable them to create a sound and viable technological base’. However, research indicates 
that even based on comparatively lax criteria, only 22% of reported initiatives by developed 
countries fulfilled Article 66(2).98 Accordingly this mechanism has been the subject of a 
number of criticisms for its lack of effectiveness in transferring technologies from developed 
countries to developing countries.99 Among many reasons behind this lack of effectiveness,100 
insufficient financial incentive is one of the key factors. For this reason, the establishment of 
a global technology acquisition fund101 financed by developed countries, either within the 
shipping industry or under a broader UNFCCC regime, might contribute to addressing this 
problem. Alternatively this fund could also be linked to the MBM proposal on the 
International GHG Fund. However, it remains unclear whether this proposal is feasible and 




                                                             
96 Nitya Nanda and Nidhi Srivastava, 'Clean Technology Transfer and Intellectual Property Rights' (2009) 9(3) Sustainable 
Development Law & Policy 42-69, at 46.  
97 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), Annex 1C of the Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, 15 April 1994, 33 ILM 1125.  
98 Meanwhile the commencement year for developing countries that are party to the WTO to adopt TRIPS has been 
postponed from 2006 to 2013, and even to 2016 for some countries as it relates to protections for pharmaceuticals. It is thus 
difficult to get relevant data on the TRIPS-based transfer of technologies from developing countries. Amanda Watson, 'Does 
TRIPs Increase Technology Transfer to the Developing World? The Empirical Evidence' (2011) 20(3) Information & 
Communications Technology Law 253-278, at 271,273.  
99 See, e.g., Wei Guo, 'The TRIPs Agreement Does Little to Promote the Development of Technology Transfer to Developing 
Countries' (2009) 3(3) Management Science and Engineering 20-27; Nanda and Srivastava, supra note 96, at 46. But Navraj 
Singh asserts that intellectual property rights protection is only a relatively peripheral factor contributing to the 
ineffectiveness of climate technology transfer. Ghaleigh Navraj Singh, 'Barriers to Climate Technology Transfer - The 
Chimera of Intellectual Property Rights' (2011) 5(2) Carbon & Climate Law Review: CCLR 220-233, at 233.  
100 These reasons include the lack of financial means by developing countries, lack of intellectual property rights (IPR) 
protection in developing countries, monopoly created by IPR-based market power, and so on. Nanda and Srivastava, supra 
note 96, at 43-44; Navraj Singh, supra note 99, at 229-231.  
101 Nanda and Srivastava, supra note 96, at 46.  
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MBMs are one of the main tools of environmental policy,102 and have been employed by 
many countries to regulate adverse environmental impacts resulting from anthropogenic 
activities. The objective of MBMs is to address the market failure of ‘environmental 
externalities’.103 This is achieved either by ‘incorporating the external cost of production or 
consumption activities through taxes or charges on processes or products’, or by ‘creating 
property rights and facilitating the establishment of a proxy market for the use of 
environmental services’.104 Where MBMs are designed to internalise the external cost of 
GHG emissions from international shipping by means of a GHG Fund or different emission 
trading schemes, they will provide the polluters (shipowners and ship operators) with an 
economic incentive to reduce their GHG emissions.105 In this sense, these types of MBMs are 
also consistent with the polluter-pays principle.106  
MBMs have been controversial since they were formally put forward in the ‘2000 IMO 
GHG Study’. The IMO has endeavoured to promote MBMs by enhancing understanding of 
them through publishing various reports.107 Due to the possible negative impact of MBMs on 
their shipping industries, many developing countries oppose the use of MBMs in tackling 
shipping GHG emissions.108 However, it is anticipated that MBMs will in time be adopted by 
the IMO or other international institutions to reduce GHG emissions from ships. First, recent 
research indicates that using the EEDI and SEEMP alone will not achieve absolute emission 
reduction, due to projected growth in world trade. 109  While there is still room for 
improvement on current energy-efficiency measures and relevant work is being conducted 
                                                             
102 Environmental policies are often classified as command-and-control, market-based, education, provision of information, 
and voluntary measures. Thomas Dietz and Paul C. Stern, 'Exploring New Tools for Environmental Protection' in Thomas 
Dietz and Paul C. Stern (eds), New Tools for Environmental Protection: Education, Information, and Voluntary Measures 
(National Academies Press, Washington, 2002) at 4.  
103 Environmental externalities ‘refer to the economic concept of uncompensated environmental effects of production and 
consumption that affect consumer utility and enterprise cost outside the market mechanism’. OECD, ‘Environmental 
Externalities’, 4 March 2003, available at http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=824.  
104 OECD, ‘Market-based Instruments’, 23 July 2007, available at http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=7214.  
105 Generally the shipping industry responds quickly to economic instruments and the associated change in transportation 
costs, and registration with FOC States by most of the world shipping fleets is an example. See Garyfalia Nikolakaki, 
'Economic Incentives for Maritime Shipping relating to Climate Protection' (2013) 12(1) WMU Journal of Maritime Affairs 
17-39, at 20.  
106 Harilaos N. Psaraftis, 'Market-based Measures for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Ships: A Review' (2012) 11(2) WMU 
Journal of Maritime Affairs 211-232, at 213.  
107 To date some IMO-commissioned reports have been published, including the 2000 IMO GHG Study, 2009 Second IMO 
GHG Study, 2009 Scientific Study on International Shipping and Market-based Instruments, and 2010 Feasibility and Impact 
Assessment Report. Some IMO-sponsored reports are under way, such as an update of the 2009 GHG Emissions Estimate, 
and a report on possible impacts on consumers and industries in developing countries.  
108 See, e.g., Uncertainties and Problems in Market-based Measures, submitted by China and India, MEPC 61st Session, 
Agenda Item 5, Doc MEPC 61/5/24 (5 August 2010).  
109 Bazari and Longva, supra note 68, executive summary, at 8.  
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within the IMO, a technical breakthrough is unlikely to be achieved soon, given the 
intricacies of ship types and shipping features. Currently global emissions are ‘considerably 
higher’ than the level consistent with the 2o Celsius target for reduction in global warming to 
be achieved in 2020, and this trend continues.110 Under the circumstances, it might be a better 
choice for the international shipping industry to explore more options rather than waiting for 
the effects of applying energy-efficiency measures to appear. Second, as discussed earlier, 
from an international law perspective, it is logical to apply both the CBDR and NMFT 
principles in future MBMs, and proposals applying the principles have been submitted to the 
IMO by different countries and non-governmental organizations. 111  As shown from the 
comments by some developing countries, the core debate within the MEPC centres on the 
CBDR principle not being reflected in many MBM proposals. Once this problem is addressed, 
it may be possible to adopt MBMs acceptable to most countries.  
To date various MBM proposals have been discussed and debated within the IMO and 
further modified by relevant countries and organizations. Currently seven types of MBM 
options are available. They are:  
 
• GHG Fund, one option was proposed by Cyprus, Denmark, the Marshall Islands, 
Nigeria and the International Parcel Tankers Association (IPTA), and the other 
option was proposed by the Clean Shipping Coalition (CSC);112 
• Port State Levy, proposed by Jamaica;113 
• Efficiency Incentive Scheme (EIS), proposed by Japan and the World Shipping 
Council (WSC);114 
                                                             
110 United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), 'The Emissions Gap Report 2012: A UNEP Synthesis Report', 
November 2012, available at http://www.unep.org/pdf/2012gapreport.pdf, executive summary, at 1. The 2o Celsius target 
refers to the target of limiting an increase of global mean surface temperature warming by no more than 2 o Celsius relative 
to pre-industrial temperatures by 2100. Joeri Rogelj, William Hare, Jason Lowe, Detlef P. van Vuuren, Keywan Riahi, Ben 
Matthews, Tatsuya Hanaoka, Kejun Jiang and Malte Meinshausen, 'Emission Pathways Consistent with a 2oC Global 
Temperature Limit' (2011) 1(8) Nature Climate Change 413-418, at 413.  
111 For example, WWF suggested that a MBM that is both global and differentiated was possible to develop, incorporating 
both the CBDR and the NMFT principles simultaneously, and it also put forward a specific revenue allocation scheme for 
different countries. Benefits and Possible Adverse Impacts of Market-based Instruments, submitted by WWF, MEPC 58th 
Session, Agenda Item 4, Doc MEPC 58/4/39 (15 August 2008). This approach was also adopted by the Scientific Study on 
International Shipping and Market-based Instruments, a study led by the University of Cambridge in partnership with 
Cambridge Econometrics, MARINTEK, Manchester Metropolitan University, and Deutsches Zentrum fΰr Luft-und 
Raumfahrt e.V. Scientific Study on International Shipping and Market-based Instruments, MEPC 60th Session, Agenda Item 
4, Doc MEPC 60/INF.21 (15 January 2010).   
112 This proposal is to establish a global reduction target for international shipping, set by either UNFCCC or IMO. 
Emissions above the target line would be offset largely by purchasing approved emission reduction credits. The offsetting 
activities would be financed by a contribution paid by ships on every tonne of bunker fuel purchased.  
113 This proposal aims to levy a uniform emissions charge on all vessels calling at their port, based on the amount of fuel 
consumed by the vessel on its voyage to that port (not bunker suppliers). The CBDR principle could be achieved through a 
self-administered national or regional fund and/or some international mechanism.  
114 According to this proposal, all new ships, except for those which meet pre-set EEDI thresholds, and existing ships are 
required to make payment contributions based on the amount of the bunker fuel consumed/purchased and the degree to 
which the ship’s efficiency falls short of a specific standard. Funds collected go to an International GHG Fund and its Parties 
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• Ship Efficiency and Credit Trading (SECT), proposed by the United States;115 
• Global Emissions Trading System (ETS) for international shipping, three options 
proposed by Norway (Germany was later added as a co-sponsor), United 
Kingdom, and France, respectively;116 
• Penalty on Trade and Development, proposed by Bahamas;117 and 
• Rebate Mechanism (RM) for a market-based instrument for international 
shipping, proposed by the International Union for Conservation of Nature 
(IUCN).118 
 
These MBM proposals can be grouped into three categories, namely environmental fee- 
related MBM proposals, tradable permit scheme-related MBM proposals, and hybrid MBM 
proposals. Of the seven MBM options, GHG Fund, Port State Levy, and Penalty on Trade and 
Development belong to the category of environmental fee-related MBMs. They provide the 
polluter with an incentive to reduce GHG emissions in order to pay lower fees which take the 
form of a contribution, a levy, or a penalty. The three types of ETS are tradable permit 
scheme-related MBMs, which seek to reduce GHG emissions through setting a global 
cap/reduction target and allocating emissions allowances. The Efficiency Incentive Scheme 
and Ship Efficiency and Credit Trading can be regarded as hybrid MBMs with the EEDI as a 
benchmark, whereas the Rebate Mechanism is a hybrid MBM built into any other MBM.  
A number of assessments on the pros and cons of these MBM proposals have been 
conducted by various States and research institutions.119 However, no MBM proposals have 
been widely accepted by most countries. Countries’ preferences for different MBM options 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
decide how to allocate the revenue either to long-term in-sector reduction or to a Fund to be established under UNFCCC.  
115 Subject all ships to mandatory energy-efficiency standards. As one means of complying with the standard, an efficiency-
credit trading programme would be established, and these standards would become more stringent over time. Currently this 
proposal becomes an optional addition to a phased approach energy-efficiency proposal newly submitted by the United 
States. 
116 This proposal aims to set a sector-wide cap on net emissions from international shipping. A number of allowances (Ship 
Emission Units) corresponding to the cap would be released into the market each year via a global auctioning process. The 
units could then be traded.  
117 This proposal holds that the imposition of any costs should be proportionate to the contribution by international shipping 
to global CO2 emissions. The reduction will apply to individual ships and not Member States, and developing States will not 
be faced with a penalty on trade and development. Currently Bahamas has modified this MBM proposal into a technical and 
operational proposal, but this option as a MBM still remains.  
118 This proposal aims to compensate developing countries for the financial impact of a MBM. It could be either applied to 
any maritime MBM which generates revenue (add-on option) or integrated with the International Maritime Emission 
Reduction Scheme (IMERS) (integrated option). 
119 See, e.g., Grouping and Evaluation of Proposed MBMs, submitted by Greece, Intersessional Meeting of the Working 
Group on GHG Emissions from Ships 3rd Session, Agenda Item 3, Doc GHG-WG 3/3 (24 February 2011); The Evaluation 
on the Relative Strengths and Weaknesses of the Reduction Mechanisms Employed by the MBM Proposals, submitted by the 
Republic of Korea, Intersessional Meeting of the Working Group on GHG Emissions from Ships 3rd Session, Agenda Item 3, 
Doc GHG-WG 3/3/1 (25 February 2011); Full Report of the Work Undertaken by the Expert Group on Feasibility Study and 
Impact Assessment of Possible Market-based Measures, MEPC 61st Session, Agenda Item 5, Doc MEPC 61/INF.2 (13 
August 2010).  
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vary widely. The GHG Fund is predicted to have a low administrative cost.120 It has been 
welcomed by most of the global and national shipping industry associations.121 The Rebate 
Mechanism serves as ‘the only differentiation option being currently considered to 
compensate less developed countries [for] the costs/impacts of a global MBM scheme’,122 
and thus incorporates the CBDR principle. To date global shipping associations generally 
have been opposed to ETS, whereas the shipping associations in some of the UNFCCC 
Annex I States have supported it.123 
 
The Response from the Shipping Industry in China 
 
Undoubtedly, the regulatory measures that have been adopted by the IMO, such as the EEDI 
and SEEMP, or MBMs possibly to be adopted in the future, will increase transportation costs 
for the shipping industry, and may also have an impact on international trade.124  These 
impacts will be greater for UNFCCC Non-Annex I States (developing countries) than 
UNFCCC Annex I States (developed countries).125 Therefore, whether the shipping industry 
in a country can absorb these higher costs will influence to a significant extent their 
compliance with these measures. Compared to the development of the shipping industries in 
                                                             
120 Full Report of the Work Undertaken by the Expert Group on Feasibility Study and Impact Assessment of Possible Market-
based Measures, MEPC 61st Session, Agenda Item 5, Doc MEPC 61/INF.2 (13 August 2010) at 14-16. This report shows 
that the increased cost for the GHG Fund is the lowest among current MBM proposals except for the Penalty on Trade and 
Development proposed by the Bahamas.  
121 See, e.g., the International Chamber of Shipping, and the shipowners Associations in Greece and the Republic of Korea 
announced that their preferred MBM is GHG Fund- or levy-related. Operational Energy Efficiency of New and Existing 
Ships, submitted by the International Chamber of Shipping (ICS), MEPC 64th Session, Agenda Item 5, Doc MEPC 64/5/11 
(27 July 2012) at para 11; Union of Greek Shipowners, ‘Prevention of Environmental Pollution by Ships: Regulation and 
Compensation Regimes and Industry Standards’, 2011, available at 
http://www.nee.gr/default.asp?t=anakoinoseisDetails&id=13, at 29; Sang-Yoon Lee and Young-Tae Chang, 'Shipping 
Companies' Awareness and Preparedness for Greenhouse Gas Regulations: A Korean Case' in Theo Notteboom (ed), Current 
Issues in Shipping, Ports and Logistics (UPA University Press, Antwerp, 2011) 25-50, at 44.  
122 Report of the Third Intersessional Meeting of the Working Group on Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Ships, note by the 
Secretariat, MEPC 62nd Session, Agenda Item 5, Doc MEPC 62/5/1 (8 April 2011) Annex 2, at 57.  
123 See, e.g., the Round Table of International Shipping Associations opposed any ETS in that it would be ‘unworkable’ for 
the shipping industry. Round Table of International Shipping Associations, ‘Round Table Associations Position Paper on 
GHG+MBMs’, 22 February 2012, available at 
https://www.bimco.org/About/Press/Press_Releases/2012/2012_02_22_Round_Table_MBM.aspx. 
    The national shipowners associations in Australia, Belgium, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom released a 
discussion paper in 2009 supporting a global cap-and-trade ETS to reduce GHG emissions from international shipping. See 
Australian Shipowners Association, Royal Belgian Shipowners’ Association, Swedish Shipowners’ Association, Norwegian 
Shipowners’ Association, and British Shipping, ‘A Global Cap-and-Trade System to Reduce Carbon Emissions from 
International Shipping’, 2009, available at http://www.asa.com.au/wp-content/uploads/Joint-Industry-ETS-Discussion-
PapervFINAL1.pdf.  
124 See Kevin P. Gallagher, 'International Trade and Air Pollution: Estimating the Economic Costs of Air Emissions from 
Waterborne Commerce Vessels in the United States' (2005) 77(2) Journal of Environmental Management 99-103, at 103.  
125 Haifeng Wang, 'Economic Costs of CO2 Emissions Reduction for Non-Annex I Countries in International Shipping' (2010) 
14(4) Energy for Sustainable Development 280-286, at 285.  
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UNFCCC Annex I States, the development of these industries in UNFCCC Non-Annex I 
States generally started later and has lagged behind in many respects. Given the challenges 
involved in the reduction of GHG emissions from ships, the shipping industries in these Non-
Annex I countries are facing barriers resulting from historical, financial and technological 
gaps. This section takes China as an example to examine the responses from the shipping 
industries in UNFCCC Non-Annex I States.  
 
An Introduction to China’s Shipping Industry 
 
China has a lengthy continental coastline of approximately 18,000 kilometres.126 A number of 
excellent natural ports are located around the coast; in 2003 the coastal areas contributed 50% 
of China’s GDP and constituted 80% of the country’s international trade value.127 Until 2010, 
over 90% of China’s imports and exports were moved by international shipping.128 These 
advantageous natural resources, together with preferential policies by central and local 
governments, have made possible the rapid development of China’s shipping industry. As at 1 
January 2012, China controlled the fourth-largest owned fleet (in dwt) in the world with 2060 
vessels registered in China and 1569 registered in other flag States.129 The dwt controlled by 
China in that year covered 8.91% of the world total.130 Established in 1961, the China Ocean 
Shipping (Group) Company (COSCO) is the first Chinese international shipping company. 
However, only after 1978, when China adopted its reforms and opening-up policies, has 
China’s international shipping sector started its rapid development. 131  In 2010 China’s 
shipbuilding sector ranked first in the world in three categories, namely its accomplished 
shipbuilding output, volume of new ship orders and holding orders, which covered 43%, 54% 
and 41% of the world market, respectively.132 According to research jointly undertaken by 
Lloyd’s Register, QinetiQ, and the University of Strathclyde, by 2030, the China-owned fleet 
will probably reach 19-24% of the world fleet, rivalling Greece and other European 
                                                             
126 This section only discusses the mainland China, excluding Chinese Hong Kong, Macau, and Chinese Taipei.  
127 Weijie Gao, ‘Development Strategy of Chinese Shipping Company under the Multilateral Framework of WTO’, 2003, 
available at http://www.cosco.com/en/pic/forum/654923323232.pdf.  
128 Xinchun Rong, ‘Development and Evolution of China's Shipping Industry (1949-2010)’, 31 October 2012, available at 
http://economy.guoxue.com/?p=7575 (in Chinese).  
129 UNCTAD, supra note 49, at 41.  
130 Ibid.  
131 Gao, supra note 127, at 2.  
132 Yuzhen Xie, Shuohui Zhang, and Junsong Han, 'The Impacts of the EEDI on the Chinese Shipbuilding and Shipping 
Industries' (2011) 11 China Maritime 23-26, at 24 (in Chinese).  
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countries.133 As a UNFCCC Non-Annex I State, China has promoted its shipping industry to 
a high level in terms of its shipbuilding capability and shipping fleet. 
      The shipping associations in China mainly include the China Classification Society 
(CCS), the China Association of the National Shipbuilding Industry (CANSI), and the China 
Shipowners Association (CSA). Due to China’s unique political structure, work on the 
reduction of GHG emissions from ships is dominated or guided by the government, mainly 
implemented by shipping companies, supported by the shipping industry, and participated in 
by the public.134 Most shipping companies, in particular large-scale companies, are state-
owned. This situation means that the response of the shipping industry in China is often 
consistent with the positions of the Chinese government. 
In 2009, the Chinese government announced its GHG emissions control target, before 
the 2009 Copenhagen climate change conference. It stated that it would cut its CO2 emissions 
per unit of GDP by 40% to 45% by 2020 from the 2005 level. Against this backdrop, on 12 
March 2012, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology of the People’s Republic 
of China released a ‘Development Plan for the Ship Industry during the 12th Five-Year Plan 
(2011-2015)’, which seeks a greater role for China’s shipping industry around the world by 
making it ‘powerful’ rather than simply ‘big’. To reach this goal, this document claims that 
the current structure of the shipping sector needs to be optimised and upgraded, its 
technological innovation and overall quality should be improved, and the energy efficiency 
requirement in the ship design and shipbuilding should be strengthened.135 As a follow-up to 
this Development Plan, China’s shipping industry was allocated its sector-reduction target by 
the Ministry of Transport. This target requires the shipping companies to reduce their energy 
consumption and CO2 emissions per unit turnover by 15% and 16%, respectively, from the 
2005 level by the end of 2015.136 Although GHG emissions from international shipping are 
excluded from this target, China’s shipping industry still pays much attention to the efforts of 
the IMO in reducing shipping emissions. This is because the shipbuilding sector, as a key 
sector of China’s shipping industry participating in international business, must comply with 
                                                             
133 Lloyd's Register QinetiQ, and University of Strathclyde, 'Global Marine Trends 2030', 2013, available at 
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/ysc3kkspzsxs6de/n9hnjB3CQf/GMT2030%20LowRes.pdf, at 83.  
134 Jianhua Zhu, 'Approaches for the Reduction of Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Ships in China' (2010) 1 Research on 
Waterborne Transportation 1-4, at 1 (in Chinese).  
135 Ministry of Industry and Information Technology of the People’s Republic of China, 'Development Plan for the Ship 
Industry during the 12th Five-Year Plan (2011-2015)', 2012, available at http://www.china.com.cn/policy/txt/2012-
03/12/content_24876042.htm, at 5-6 (in Chinese).  
136 Zonghui Xie, 'Jointly Establish A Green Industry Chain for the Shipping Industry', China Waterborne Transportation 
Newspaper, 22 September 2011, available at http://www.zgsyzz.com/Article/ShowInfo.asp?ID=5318 (in Chinese).  
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the IMO rules so as to meet the requirements of its current and potential customers. This 
probably also explains why China did not object to the amended Annex VI to the MARPOL 
to avoid the application of the Regulation137 although Article 16(2)(g)(ii) of the MARPOL  
would have allowed it to do so.138 Another benefit is that while complying with international 
rules the industry can also meet its domestic reduction target. 
Developing countries can roughly be classified into three categories – major developing 
flag States, major FOC States,139 and other developing States – based on their regulatory 
interests. The views from the shipping industries in these countries on the GHG issue differ. 
As discussed earlier, major FOC States are usually more interested in obtaining income from 
registering foreign ships than effectively managing the ships flying their flags. Since the cost 
for complying with the energy-efficiency measures and MBMs will be borne by foreign 
shipowners and ship operators, these FOC States are not overly concerned with these 
regulations,140 and the numbers of ships owned by their own nationals are often negligible. 
Major developing flag States are mainly importing countries, such as China, India, Brazil, 
South Africa and Saudi Arabia. Most of these countries have a large owned fleet,141 and their 
international trade can be easily affected by the IMO’s regulatory measures.142 For these 
reasons the shipping industries in these countries have actively participated in the IMO’s 
regulatory discussions and contributed to this regulatory process. Apart from the above two 
types of developing countries, the other developing countries are in the third category. 
Generally these countries do not have long coastlines and lack competitive shipping 
industries. Although some of these countries suffer from adverse climate change impacts and 
                                                             
137 Report of the Marine Environment Protection Committee on Its Sixty-Second Session, MEPC 62nd Session, Agenda Item 
24, Doc MEPC 62/24 (26 July 2011) Annex 20, at 2. In 2011 China lodged a statement to the MEPC 62 Report. The report 
provides that ‘the Chinese delegation opposes the adoption of this amendment and [is] in no position to acknowledge and 
accept the amendment’. However, China gave up its right to object to the amendment and only Brazil and Finland objected 
due to the obstacles in their domestic legislation. 
138
 Article 16(2)(g)(ii) of MARPOL 73/78 provides that ‘…the amendment deemed to have been accepted in accordance 
with the foregoing conditions shall enter into force six months after its acceptance for all the Parties with the exception of 
those which, before that date, have made a declaration that they do not accept it or a declaration under subparagraph (f)(ii), 
that their express approval is necessary’. See also Harrison, supra note 21, at 19.  
139
 Based on the groupings established by the UNCTAD, major FOC States refer to those countries where more than 90 per 
cent of their flagged ships by tonnage are owned by foreign nationals. UNCTAD, supra note 49, at 46. 
140 An example is that major FOC States, such as Panama and Liberia, have seldom submitted proposals to the IMO although 
they voted for the proposed regulation of the energy efficiency measures in July 2011. Report of the Marine Environment 
Protection Committee on Its Sixty-Second Session, MEPC 62nd Session, Agenda Item 24, Doc MEPC 62/24 (26 July 2011) at 
para 6.110.  
141 For example, as of 1 January 2012 China and South Korea owned the fourth- and fifth-largest fleets in the world, 
respectively; India, Brazil and Saudi Arabia owned, respectively, the sixteenth-, twenty-first-, and twenty-second-largest 
fleets in the world. UNCTAD, supra note 49, at 41.  
142 Tao Wang and Jim Watson, 'China's Carbon Emissions and International Trade: Implications for Post-2012 Policy' (2008) 
8(6) Climate Policy 577-587, at 585.  
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their shipping industries are thus more willing to accept stringent regulatory measures,143 they 
rarely express their views on these issues in global fora. For the purpose of this article, the 
views of China’s shipping industry on the GHG issue are examined. These views also reflect 
to a significant extent the responses of the shipping industries in other major developing 
countries.  
 
Response to the Technical and Operational Measures 
 
Generally China’s shipping industry has different views towards proposed technical, 
operational and MBMs under discussion within the IMO. As far as the technical and 
operational measures are concerned, the shipping industry welcomes the efforts of the IMO 
and agrees that the IMO is the most competent institution to regulate this issue. 
Representatives from shipping companies actively participated in the discussions on the 
proposed EEDI and SEEMP, and submitted their proposed modification of the EEDI formula 
to the IMO through the Chinese government. After the adoption of the energy efficiency rules 
by the IMO in July 2011, the CCS released its Rules for Green Ships on 10 July 2012, the 
first rules of this kind in the world,144 as well as the Attained EEDI Calculation Guide and 
EEDI Verification Guide. These rules serve as the industry’s guidelines for compliance with 
IMO regulations through the incorporation of the EEDI and SEEMP requirements into 
China’s domestic ship classification. They provide information that China’s shipbuilding 
industry will abide by international shipbuilding standards in building its ships for 
international buyers. As discussed earlier, Regulation 19 of MARPOL Annex VI allows all 
flag States, including the Chinese government, to postpone their implementation of the EEDI 
Regulation till the year 2019. However, it appears that China’s shipbuilding industry will not 
utilise this right due to the fierce competition in the international shipbuilding market. Even 
before the adoption of Rules for Green Ships by the CCS, the French classification society 
had issued an EEDI Certificate, the first such certificate in Asia, to a bulk carrier with 63,500 
dwt built by the SinoPacific Shipbuilding Group.145 In practice, however, Chinese shipping 
                                                             
143 Wang, supra note 125, at 285; Report of the Marine Environment Protection Committee on its 58th Session, Doc MEPC 
58/23 (16 October 2008) Annex 9, at 21. A statement lodged by the delegation of Vanuatu provides that ‘some Pacific Micro 
States are already scheduled to disappear. This is the reason why Vanuatu, although classified as a least developing State, is 
in favour of a global solution’. 
144 China Classification Society (CCS), ‘Green Ships Recognising the EEDI’, 2012, available at 
http://www.ccs.org.cn/ccswz/font/fontAction!moudleIndex.do?moudleId=61 (in Chinese). The Rules for Green Ships 
entered into force on 1 October 2012.  
145 Takungpao, ‘New Ship Built by SinoPacific Shipbuilding Group First Obtained the EEDI Certificate’, 24 February 2012, 
available at http://www.csoa.cn/xuliebd/jienengjp/201202/t20120224_1198135.html (in Chinese).  
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companies often reduce their GHG emissions by employing large vessels and slowing down 
their speed, a strategy which is said to be commonly utilised by other large shipping 
companies, such as the Maersk Line.146 
In common with China’s shipping industry, the shipping industries in many other 
UNFCCC Non-Annex I States hold similar views on the role of the IMO in regulating 
technical and operational measures on this issue. For instance, the South Korean shipbuilding 
sector has been very supportive of the efforts of the IMO in regulating energy efficiency 
measures to reduce GHG emissions from ships. It participated in the IMO discussions on the 
proposed EEDI and provided a new concept approach and formula for EEDI covering the 
various types of propulsion systems and power generation systems through the South Korean 
government.147 However, the Indian shipping industry asserts that the UNFCCC, which backs 
the CBDR principle, should be the central body regulating this issue, and that the IMO should 
be responsible to the UNFCCC for this purpose.148 
While China’s shipbuilding industry has responded positively to the newly adopted 
EEDI and SEEMP Regulation by the IMO, it also recognises that these new rules, in 
particular the EEDI, have imposed great challenges on it. First, as stated by the Chinese 
delegation at the IMO, the CBDR principle that it asserted during the IMO negotiations has 
not been reflected ‘in a full and objective manner’ within the amended MARPOL Annex VI 
in 2011.149 The consequence of this is that the CBDR principle, confirmed as a basic principle 
in the global climate change regime by the UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol, has been further 
weakened in the shipping arena from the technical perspective. Although technically it is 
more feasible to apply the NMFT principle in this regard, ignoring the historical contribution 
to GHG emissions by developed countries will lead to an unfair extra burden for the shipping 
industry in developing countries, including China. Regarding this position of insisting on the 
incorporation of the CBDR principle into the GHG issue, China’s shipping industry is not 
alone. A number of UNFCCC Non-Annex I States, including Brazil, Cuba, India, Peru, Saudi 
Arabia and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, have expressed similar views and have 
                                                             
146 Erde Wang, 'Agreement Achieved through Reduction Negotiations and China Is to Start Its Reduction in 2019', 21st 
Century Business Herald (Beijing), 26 July 2011, available at http://stock.sohu.com/20110726/n314586469.shtml (in 
Chinese).  
147 Proposal for New Concept Approach to EEDI for New Ships, submitted by the Republic of Korea, Intersessional Meeting 
of the Greenhouse Gas Working Group 2nd Session, Agenda Item 2, Doc GHG-WG 2/2/12 (6 February 2009).  
148 Anil Devli, ‘Overview of the Shipping Sector in India’, 1 April 2011, available at 
http://www.ahlers.com/images/news/2011/overview%20of%20the%20shipping%20sector%20in%20india%20%28mr%20an
il%20devli%29.pdf, at 8.  
149 Report of the Marine Environment Protection Committee on Its Sixty-Second Session, MEPC 62nd Session, Agenda Item 
24, Doc MEPC 62/24 (26 July 2011) Annex 20, at 1.  
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been supported by their shipping industries.150 
Second, China’s shipping industry supports its government in opposing the technical and 
operational measures being regulated in the form of MARPOL Annex VI. It takes the view 
that CO2  is not technically a pollutant, and therefore should not be regulated in Annex VI of 
MARPOL in which severe air pollutants are addressed.151 In particular GHGs are currently 
not regulated as a type of pollution in Chinese domestic law. The Air Pollution Prevention 
and Control Law of China (adopted in 1987 and amended twice in 1995 and 2000, 
respectively) does not regulate GHGs and is currently under discussion for another revision. 
It is predicted that GHGs will not be regulated in the upcoming revision of this law due to 
pressure from various national industries. This opinion was supported by some UNFCCC 
Non-Annex I States when the issue was discussed within the IMO.152 Nevertheless, given the 
fact that energy efficiency measures have been adopted, these member States will need to 
update their domestic law so as to comply with the IMO instrument. 
Third, it will be more costly for China’s shipping industry to achieve the regularly 
upgraded EEDI standards. New Chapter 4 of MARPOL Annex VI provides a four-phased 
reduction schedule. During the period 2013 to 2025, the EEDI reference line parameters for 
relevant ship types and reduction rates, as well as the time periods, will be reviewed and 
amended regularly to reflect the latest status of technological development.153 However, it is 
often recognised that China’s shipping industry is ‘big but not powerful’ and China ‘does not 
have sufficient say in global shipping pricing’.154 A report by the CANSI reveals that, in 
comparison with European countries, the USA, Japan and the Republic of Korea, the Chinese 
shipbuilding sector aims at building middle- and low-level vessels and lacks core 
technologies and capability in its Research and Development (R&D), which objectively 
                                                             
150 See, e.g., Report of the Marine Environment Protection Committee on Its Sixtieth Session, MEPC 60th Session, Agenda 
Item 22, Doc MEPC 60/22 (12 April 2010) at para 4.44; Devli, supra note 148.  
151 Report of the Marine Environment Protection Committee on Its Sixtieth Session, MEPC 60th Session, Agenda Item 22, 
Doc MEPC 60/22 (12 April 2010) Annex 4, at 2.  
152 This view has been supported by Brazil, India, Saudi Arabia and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. For example, the 
delegation of Saudi Arabia stated that ‘[MARPOL] was for the prevention of pollution into the marine environment. 
Greenhouse gas emissions are not classified by the UN as pollutants’. Report of the Marine Environment Protection 
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3.  
153 MARPOL Annex VI (2011) Reg 21(6).  
154 Suranjana Roy Bhattacharya, 'Chinese Shipping Industry Is Big but Not Powful', Gulf News, 19 July 2010, available at 
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makes its profit rate quite low.155 In order to meet the EEDI requirements and reduce shipping 
costs, a three-party conference, participated in by Chinese ship owners/operators, 
shipbuilders, and classification societies, was held in Beijing in November 2011. The main 
topic of the conference was to research, design and build green ships jointly so as to maintain 
and promote the competitiveness of China’s shipping industry. Aside from the increased cost 
in relation to R&D, China’s shipbuilding companies may need to purchase some of the 
energy-efficient technologies from other countries. In practice it is difficult for them to get 
technologies through the transfer of technology arrangement as indicated in Regulation 23 of 
MARPOL Annex VI, due to the classification of ‘newly industrialised [developing] country’ 
imposed on China by some economists.156 This increased cost, including extra investment in 
more energy-efficiency technologies, will apply to all countries, in particular UNFCCC Non-
Annex I States. However, due to different technological and financial situations, the pressures 
on the shipping industries from these countries will be different.  
    Last but not least, the Chinese shipping industry is concerned about whether the EEDI 
benchmark, a technological standard, will become a type of trade barrier for developing 
countries.157 This concern is not groundless. On the one hand, currently the core energy-
efficient technologies in shipbuilding are primarily controlled by a few developed countries 
or regional blocs like the EU, and China does not have sufficient say in the drafting of the 
EEDI formula and reference line.158  On the other hand, the setting of this floatable and 
upgrading EEDI standard actually raises the trading threshold for ships from most developing 
countries. Based on the mandatory EEDI requirements, substandard ships might be detained, 
fined by port States or even not allowed to trade.159 This concern has been shared by the 
shipping industries from many UNFCCC Non-Annex I States. Due to its disadvantages in 
relation to shipping technologies when compared to other countries, the shipping industry in 
India has taken the view that the newly adopted EEDI and SEEMP are ‘not so benign’.160 
This might be true with regard to the decreased number of orders that India’s shipping 
industry has obtained in recent years. To change this situation, the Shipyards Association of 
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India (SAI) suggested that domestic shipowners support Indian shipyards by placing their 
orders at home.161 To expand its global market share in the shipping industry, the Indian 
government has taken various measures, including introducing a shipbuilding subsidy scheme 
and transfer of technology,162 to promote its shipping industry. Facing the stringent EEDI 
requirements, shipping associations like the Indian Coastal Conference Shipping Association 
(ICCSA) encourage their member companies to employ qualified vessels. For example, the 
Shipping Corporation of India Ltd. (SCI) has made it a rule that the EEDI should be 
implemented at the design stage for its ships so as to reduce GHG emissions from ships.163 It 
seems that the shipping industries in major developing countries have attempted to comply 
with the energy-efficiency measures adopted by the IMO. Nevertheless, due to their lack of 
energy-efficient technologies, the shipping industries in these developing countries still need 
the effective transfer of technologies as discussed earlier to strengthen their capacity in 
implementing their obligations under the amended MARPOL Annex VI. 
It is concluded that China’s shipping industry supports the efforts of the IMO in 
adopting the EEDI and SEEMP measures. Before these measures were adopted, China’s 
shipping industry contributed to the improvement of these measures by participating in 
various IMO discussions through the Chinese government. After the adoption of these 
measures, China’s shipping industry responded quickly and enacted its own rules to 
incorporate them into China’s ship classification requirements, although these measures will 
potentially impose significant implementation and cost pressures on the industry. Due to 
similar financial and technological situations, the response from China’s shipping industry 
has been supported and followed by many UNFCCC Non-Annex I States. 
 
Response to the MBMs 
 
In contrast to the EEDI and SEEMP, MBMs are regarded as an even ‘bigger challenge’ by the 
Chinese shipping industry.164 First, the Chinese shipping industry believes that it is premature 
to adopt any MBMs because there are still many uncertainties and problems relating to 
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them,165 and China’s shipping sector also needs more time to conduct research to enhance its 
understanding of this issue. The influential Round Table of International Shipping 
Associations asserts that MBMs ‘are not justified at this particular time’.166 Meanwhile, to 
secure benefits to the shipping industries in developing countries, China’s shipping industry 
holds that a policy arrangement on financial, technological and capacity-building support 
from developed countries for the implementation of the EEDI and SEEMP by developing 
countries should be in place before a MBM is adopted.167 In view of these factors, to date the 
Chinese shipping industry has not explicitly expressed its preference for any of the currently 
proposed MBMs. This view has been supported by many UNFCCC Non-Annex I States. The 
Indian National Shipowners’ Association (INSA) believes that proposed MBMs will bring 
about ‘adverse outcomes’ for developing countries and does not welcome the adoption of any 
MBMs by the IMO.168 
Second, consistent with the position of the Chinese government, China’s shipping 
industry supports the leading role of the IMO in regulating technical related issues, but 
doubts the competency of the IMO to regulate MBMs. From its point of view, the IMO 
Convention gives IMO competence to regulate technical issues but not trade-related issues. 
As a trade-related measure, MBMs should be decided by the UNFCCC.169 Additionally, if a 
MBM needs to be adopted in the future, China’s view is that the CBDR principle needs to be 
incorporated.170 While the Indian shipping industry shares Chinese shipping industry view 
that the IMO’s competence is limited to technical and operational matters,171 Malaysia and 
the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) support the incorporation of both the CBDR and 
NMFT principles into the issue.172 In particular, the WWF has worked out specific schemes 
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in an attempt to incorporate both principles into MBM proposals.173  
Third, China’s shipping industry opposes unilateral actions, in particular the proposed 
inclusion of the shipping GHG emissions into an EU ETS. If this happens and the EU ETS 
which includes GHG emissions from international shipping comes into force before July 
2019, the lead period that China’s shipping industry may get to phase in changes from 
Regulation 19 of MARPOL Annex VI will become meaningless. In this case, an EU ETS 
may charge all ships calling at the ports of their member States, regardless of the flag that 
these ships are flying. In other words, the waiver that a flag State gives the ships flying its 
flag based on Regulation 19 of MARPOL Annex VI may not be recognised by an EU ETS. 
Also, due to waning demand and higher costs resulting from the global financial crisis since 
2009 and China’s over-capacity, China’s shipping industry, in particular its shipbuilding 
sector, is currently experiencing a recession. According to statistics from China’s Ministry of 
Industry and Information Technology, in 2012 the completed shipbuilding output and holding 
orders were 60,210,000 dwt and 106,950,000 dwt each, which, compared with 2011, had 
decreased by 21.4% and 28.7%, respectively. 174  Under the circumstances, any unilateral 
reduction actions will further increase shipping costs and weaken the development 
momentum of China’s shipping industry, while at the same time the authority of IMO’s 
current work will also be diminished.175 To date the EU has attributed its unilateral actions to 
the slow and unsatisfactory regulatory process of emissions reductions under the relevant 
international authorities. On 1 January 2012 the EU included the emissions from the 
international aviation industry into the EU ETS due to slow progress within the International 
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). In December 2012 the EU suspended this policy due to 
improved performance by ICAO, or perhaps because of strong opposition from many 
countries, including the US, Russia, China and India. In the same year, the EU published a 
consultation document asking for views on how best to reduce GHG emissions from ships so 
as to finally include GHG emissions from international shipping in an EU ETS.176 Once 
shipping GHG emissions are included in the EU ETS, the co-existence of two regulatory 
mechanisms, namely the EU ETS and potential IMO MBMs, will make implementation and 
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compliance by developing States shipping industries doubly difficult.  
In summary, as far as the proposed MBMs are concerned, the shipping industry in China 
takes the view that they are premature at this stage, and if they are to be adopted, they should 
be decided by the UNFCCC rather than the IMO. To secure benefits to China’s shipping 
industry, the CBDR principle should be incorporated into any MBMs that are adopted. To 
date China’s shipping industry has not expressed any preference among the current MBM 
proposals. The global shipping industry has expressed similar attitudes to China’s shipping 
industry in that these measures are not mature at this stage, whereas some national shipping 
industries in UNFCCC Annex I States support the MBMs and have expressed their 




Given the tight schedule for limiting global warming to 2o Celsius in tackling climate change, 
the reduction of GHG emissions from international shipping as an important contribution to 
achieving that target has drawn mounting attention from the international community. From 
an international law perspective, the IMO Convention and the LOSC provide the IMO with 
general competence to regulate GHG emissions from international shipping, while the Kyoto 
Protocol provides the IMO with a specific mandate to regulate this matter. These 
competences make it possible for the IMO to apply both the CBDR and NMFT principles in 
addressing GHG emissions from international shipping. 
The newly adopted energy-efficiency measures by the IMO represent a significant 
advance in reducing shipping GHG emissions from technical and operational perspectives. 
Although the CBDR principle has not been fully reflected in these measures, a certain 
flexibility has been provided to encourage their implementation by the shipping industry. 
China’s shipping industry has adopted a positive attitude in initially complying with these 
measures, although it asserts that there will be significant challenges in future implementation. 
To date seven types of MBM proposals have been discussed within the IMO in order to 
achieve more GHG emissions reductions from international shipping as a supplement to the 
energy-efficiency measures already in place. Consistent with the views of some global 
shipping associations, China’s shipping industry claims that MBMs are premature at this 
stage. Furthermore, China’s shipping industry asserts that the CBDR principle should be 
incorporated if MBMs are to be adopted. 
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The response from China’s shipping industry to the IMO’s regulatory efforts has been 
supported by many other developing countries. As more developed countries and global 
shipping organizations come to accept the application of both the CBDR and NMFT 
principles to the GHG issue, in particular the MBM proposals, it seems that finding ways to 
incorporate both principles into the issue under discussion will be the next step. 
 
